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Macro-Prudential Policies and Financial
Stability: A Theoretical Background
Yusuf B. Duniya*

I.

Introduction

T

he regulation and supervision of financial institutions has for long concentrated
on the traditional micro-prudential approach, which seeks to ascertain the state
of health of individual financial institutions with the belief that once the institutions
are healthy, financial stability would be attained as a matter of routine. However, the
global financial and economic crises of 2007/2008 made it imperative to reexamine
the whole process of banking regulation and supervision. The idea of macroprudential framework has been to complement micro-prudential regulation and
supervision in the desire to efficiently and effectively ensure soundness/stability of
individual FIs and the whole system by moderating threats to FIs and financial stability.
While micro-prudential regulation is a bottom up approach, and concentrates on
individual financial institutions, macro-prudential regulation is more appropriate for
determining vulnerabilities and threats to financial stability. Although the debate on
the effectiveness of macro-prudential regulation is ongoing, there appears to be a
consensus that it provides the most 'cornerstone solution' to financial instability by
minimizing impacts of systemic risk events. It is agreed that both micro-and macroprudential regulation should be strengthened with emphasis on complementarity
relationship between them, which may result in more robust framework for financial
regulation and supervision.
The paper is organized as follows: section two and three contains conceptual issues
and theoretical perspectives, respectively, while section four looked at
complementarity and differences between macro-prudential and micro-prudential
regulation. Thereafter, section five reviewed objectives and rationale for macroprudential regulation vis-à-vis its institutional framework and scope. Section six looked
at instruments of macro-prudential regulation and the implication of the new Basel III,
while section seven focused on institutional and governance structure as key
elements of macro-prudential regulation. The paper further gave a general insight on
how macro-prudential policy framework should be structured in section eight and
later concluded in section nine.

* Yusuf B. Duniya is a Deputy Director in the Financial Policy and Regulation Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The
usual disclaimer applies
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Macro-prudential Regulation: Conceptual Issues

The concept of macro-prudential was first used in a paper prepared by BIS for
discussion by Euro-Currency Standing Committee in July 1978 on the implications of
rising oil prices for international bank lending and the stability of the international
banking system. In June 1979, Cooke Committee underscored the issue as microprudential concerns began to emerge as macro-economic problems (macroprudential), highlighting precisely the link between prudential regulation and
macroeconomy. Subsequently, in a background paper written by Bank of England in
1979, macro-prudential regulation was proposed as a complimentary wider
perspective prudential regulation with focus on issues that mainly focus on the market
as a whole as distinct from an individual bank or financial institutions, which could not
be obvious nor addressed at the micro-prudential level. Thereafter, awareness
continued to rise on the insufficiency of micro-prudential regulation in ensuring
financial stability. The financial crises in the late 1990s, particularly the Asian financial
crisis, drew more attention to the growing interdependence between the
macroeconomy and the financial system, and emphasized the need to build
resilience to systemic shocks. Since then, application of the concept, macroprudential, has become more common in banking policy sphere.
In 2005, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Handbook described a sound and wellfunctioning financial sector as one having macro-prudential surveillance and
financial stability analysis, which was described as monitoring the effect of potential
macroeconomic and institutional factors on the soundness (risks and vulnerabilities)
and stability of financial systems as one of the key pillars.
Following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the term macro-prudential
became central in research related to strengthening regulatory and supervisory
frameworks (Aaron Brandenburg Oct., 2011). Although the concept is often
commonly used, a precise definition of macro-prudential policy remains ambiguous.
This is partly because the objective of macro-prudential policy is largely informal, as
there is neither a common framework nor a consensus on the indicators and
instruments to be considered (Hannoun, 2011, Aaron Brandenburg, 2011, Jaime
Caruana, 2011). In the IMF survey of 63 countries and the European Central Bank
conducted in December 2010, not one respondent had a formal definition of macroprudential policy. In a comment in the Financial Times of May 19, Howard Davies
(director of the London School of Economics) and David Green (former head of
international policy at the UK Financial Services Authority) said, "No one is yet clear,
nationally or internationally, quite what this term (macro-prudential) involves."

III.

Macro-Prudential: Theoretical Perspectives

On theoretical grounds, it has been argued that a reform of prudential regulation
should integrate three different paradigms: the agency paradigm, the externalities
paradigm, and the mood swings paradigm. The role of macro-prudential regulation is
particularly stressed by the last two.
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The agency paradigm highlights the importance of principal-agent problems. The
main argument is that in the role of lender-of-last-resort and provider of deposit
insurance, the government alters the incentives of banks to undertake risks, thereby
inducing principal-agent problem (moral hazard). On the other, however, the
coexistence of deposit insurances and insufficiently regulated bank portfolios induces
financial institutions to take excessive risks. This paradigm, however, assumes that risk
arises from individual institution, and hence, it is inappropriate to place emphasis on
the system as a whole, which characterizes the macro-prudential approach.
In the externalities paradigm, the key concept is called monetary externality. This is
defined as an externality that arises when one economic agent's action affects the
welfare of another agent through effects on prices. As argued by Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1986), when there are distortions in the economy (such as incomplete markets
or imperfect information) policy intervention can make everyone better off in a Pareto
efficiency sense. Indeed, a number of authors have shown that when agents face
borrowing constraints or other sorts of financial frictions, pecuniary externalities arise
and different distortions appear, such as over borrowing, excessive risk-taking and
excessive levels of short-term debt. The International Monetary Fund policy study in
2010 argued that risk externalities between financial institutions and from them to the
real economy tend to trigger market failures which justify macro-prudential regulation.
In the mood swings paradigm, rationality and greed critically influence the behaviour
of financial institutions' managers, causing excess of optimism in good times and
sudden risk retrenchment on downturn. As a result, pricing signals in financial markets
may be inefficient, increasing the likelihood of systemic trouble. A role for a forwardlooking macro-prudential supervisor, moderating uncertainty and alerting to the risks
of financial innovation, is therefore justified.

IV.

Macro-Prudential vs. Micro-prudential Regulation

As a starting point, it is useful to distinguish between “micro-prudential” and “macroprudential” approaches to financial regulation. A micro-prudential approach is one in
which regulation is partial-equilibrium in its conception, and is aimed at preventing the
costly failure of individual financial institutions. Many have argued that the weakness
of the existing framework is that it is largely micro-prudential (Crockett 2000; Brio,
Furfine and Lowe 2001; Borio 2003; Kashyap and Stein 2004; Kashyap, Rajan and Stein
2008; Brunnermeier, et al., 2009, Bank of England 2009, French et al 2010). It evaluate
each firm independently and in isolation, largely without regard to spillover and
feedback effects, and form the basis of traditional supervision and bank examination,
e.g., the “supervisory review process” that constitutes Pillar II of Basel (BIS, 2001).
Micro-prudential supervision's focus on the risk of insolvency or distress at individual firm
level reflects goals such as protecting consumers and taxpayers (via the deposit
insurance fund) and reducing distortions from the safety net. In this way, microprudential supervision takes the economy as given and thus, exogenous to the
supervisory decision-making process (Beverly Hirtle, TilSchuermann, and Kevin Stiroh,
2009). As a result of the important nexus and complementarities between micro- and
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macro-prudential regulation and supervision, care is usually taken to ensure proper
mix towards the attainment and sustenance of financial stability.
By contrast, a Macro-prudential approach recognises the importance of generalequilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole.
There seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that the
overarching orientation of financial regulation needs to move in a macro-prudential
direction. For example, Bernanke (2008) states: “Going forward, a critical question for
regulators and supervisors is what their appropriate 'field of vision' should be. Under
the current system of safety-and-soundness regulation, supervisors often focus on the
financial conditions of individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach,
which has been called system-wide or macro-prudential oversight, would broaden
the mandate of regulators and supervisors to encompass consideration of potential
systemic risks and weaknesses as well.” The combination of micro- and macroprudential supervision is necessary for effective and efficient framework for
establishing financial stability through stress testing and scenario analysis.
The current global financial crisis, which exposed gaps in public policy tools to deal
with systemic risk, has given rise to the need for macro-prudential supervision and
regulation to, among others, strengthen links among key components of a financial
system, examine carefully how systemic risk varies over time, and determine the
robustness of the system when hit by shocks or systemic risk. Excessive risk-taking,
combined with lack of prudential supervision and loose monetary policy, is generally
viewed as important contributors to the last financial crisis. The central banks and
regulators have a fundamental role in ensuring financial stability by monitoring the
performance of banks and other institutions, but their collective actions were clearly
not enough to prevent the crisis. The global financial crisis, which has also become an
economic crisis, has accentuated the importance of systematically introducing a
macro-prudential approach for assessing soundness in financial systems as well as in
individual financial institutions.
Regulators need to identify banks that do not manage their risks well. However, such
monitoring should not only be concerned with the stability of individual institutions,
but should also include a macro prudential orientation that comprises monitoring,
regulation, and supervision to examine how risk is distributed across a financial system
at any given point in time and identify as well as understand how aggregate risk
evolves over time. Although the need for a macro-prudential approach has
heightened over the past 15 years, the macro-prudential toolbox is still in the process
of development and its concepts are as complex as they are poorly understood.

V.

Macro-prudential Regulation: Objectives and Rationale

There appears to be a consensus among policy makers, theorists and academia on
the main objective of macro-prudential regulation. As put by Bank of England in 2009,
the main goal of macro-prudential regulation is to reduce the risk and the
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macroeconomic costs of financial instability. It is therefore often recognised as a
necessary ingredient to fill the gap between macroeconomic policy and the
traditional micro-prudential regulation of financial institutions. In other quarters,
macro-prudential regulation is aimed at examining trends in the financial system and
the economy as a whole that can impact financial stability and trigger large-scale
financial crisis. Macro-prudential regulation thence focuses on the financial system as
a whole to limit the chances of system-wide distress and avoid significant losses in
terms of real output.
Macro-prudential regulation may also aimed at limiting the risk of widespread
disruptions to the provision of financial services and thereby minimizing the
macroeconomic cost of financial instability and disruptions on the economy as a
whole; bearing in mind that systemic risk is driven largely by fluctuations in economic
and financial cycles over time, and the degree of inter-connectedness of financial
institutions and markets (Borio, 2003).
The justification for macro-prudential regulation therefore could be found in its
perspective of ensuring stability of the financial system as a whole as opposed to
individual firms within the system. This perspective also ensures monitoring of
conjectural and structural trends in financial markets so as to give warning of the
approach and potential impact of financial instability.
The goal of macro- prudential supervision and regulation is to reduce the probability
of distress for the entire financial system when the distress has the potential to
adversely impact on the real economy. This link incorporates a host of potential
channels, including interdependence and linkages among large financial firms
through clearing and settlement systems, common exposures, collective or “herd”
behaviour, and market failures such as externalities or moral hazard, all of which have
the potential to amplify shocks and spillover to the real economy. Supervisors have an
incentive to “lean against the wind” of broader destabilising forces with countercyclical pressures. This approach takes the stability of both the financial system and
the real economy as explicitly endogenous with respect to supervisory action, so
supervisors have a clear objective to influence the path of the economy by acting on
the banking system (Beverly Hirtle, TilSchuermann, and Kevin Stiroh, 2009).

VI.

Macro-Prudential Instruments

A large number of instruments have been proposed, however, there is no agreement
about which one should play the primary role in the implementation of macroprudential policy.
Most of these instruments aim to prevent the pro-cyclicality of the financial system on
the balance sheet (asset and liability sides) of the FIs. These include:
·
Cap on loan-to-value ratio and loan loss provisions
·
Cap on debt-to-income ratio
The following tools serve the same purpose, but additional specific functions have
been attributed to them, as noted below:
·
Countercyclical capital requirement - to avoid excessive balance-sheet
shrinkage from banks in trouble;
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·
Cap on leverage financing - to limit asset growth by tying banks' assets to their
equity (finance);
·
Levy on non-core liabilities - to mitigate pricing distortions that cause excessive
asset growth; and
·
Time-varying reserve requirement - as a means to control capital flows with
prudential purposes.
To prevent the accumulation of excessive short-term debt, the following instruments
are considered:
·
Liquidity coverage ratio;
·
Liquidity risk charges that penalise short-term funding;
·
Capital requirement surcharges proportional to size of maturity mismatch; and
·
Minimum haircut requirements on asset-backed securities
In addition, different types of contingent capital instruments (contingent convertibles
and capital insurance) have been proposed to facilitate bank's recapitalization in a
crisis event.

VII.

Basel III

Several aspects of Basel III reflect a macro-prudential approach to financial
regulation. Indeed, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision acknowledges the
systemic significance of financial institutions in maintaining financial stability. Under
Basel III, banks' capital requirements have been strengthened and new liquidity
requirements, a leverage cap and a countercyclical capital buffer have been
introduced. Also, the largest and most globally active banks are required to hold more
and higher-quality capital, which is consistent with the cross-section approach to
systemic risk.
Other traditional instruments include:
·
Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs): This covers capital adequacy, asset
quality, earnings and profitability rates, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk as
well as indicators of market liquidity, corporate and household financial
health, and real estate prices. The Indicators are set out below according to
IMF compilation guide;
·
Conduct of Stress Testing: This is used to determine the impact of shocks on the
various indicators; and
·
Early Warning Models: These models, among others, analyses the sectoral and
market vulnerabilities, country risk arising from spillover and contagion in the
financial system.
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VIII.
Institutional and Governance Structure
The institutional architecture is a core element of macro-prudential policy. The choice
of a specific institutional setup depends on myriad of conditions, and international
best practices are yet to emerge. However, there appear to be two (possibly
overlapping) key elements: an authority with a clear mandate for macro-prudential
policy; and a formal mechanism of coordination or consultation across policies aimed
at financial stability.
The need to identify an authority that oversees systemic risks and decides or
recommends policy actions reflects: the need for clarity of responsibility for containing
systemic risk, with appropriate incentives to act; the need for clarity of responsibility
over policy instruments; and the complexity of identifying and monitoring systemic risk,
given the breadth of analyses required and the underlying data needs. Such an
authority could be a body (e.g., a committee or council) or institution (e.g. a central
bank, supervisory agency); and an existing or a new one.
The need for coordination arises because macro-prudential policy interacts with other
policies, as noted above. Because financial stability may not be an objective of these
other policies, policy conflicts may arise, hence the need for more formal coordination
or consultation mechanisms. These may take an institutional form, such as committee
or council, or other forms, such as a requirement for the macro-prudential authority to
be consulted or offer advice on key decisions affecting the financial system.
Coordination is especially important when formal authority over tools affecting
specific sources of systemic risk rests with bodies other than the macro-prudential
authority. The financial services regulatory coordinating committee (FSRCC) in Nigeria
is an example of such coordinating body.
IX.
How Should the Macro-Prudential Policy Framework be structured?
The discussion under the appropriate structure is defined by three key elements of the
macro-prudential policy framework: The analytical framework to identify and monitor
systemic risks; processes to identify and collect the necessary data; and the ongoing
assessment of risks to the stability of the financial system as a whole (e.g., trends, scale,
probability, timing, system resilience) and their prioritization. The operational set of
instruments to contain risks and prevent them from becoming systemic; rules
governing the use of these instruments; and assessments of policy effectiveness. The
institutional architecture of macro-prudential policy, including mechanisms of
governance, accountability, and transparency; and coordination of macroprudential policy with other public policies aimed at preserving financial stability.
X.
Some Unanswered Questions
The arguments for and the merits of macro-prudential notwithstanding, there are
questions still begging for answers which include:

What conflict can arise between macro-prudential and other policy
objectives?
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In broad term, stability of the financial system and macro-prudential
designed to achieve it should be consistent with other desirable
economic goals;
o Instability in the financial system is likely to mean that the economy as
a whole is unable to function efficiently; and
o At the margin, however, there may be trade-offs.

How far is it possible or sensible to 'silo-size' macro-prudential policy making?

What actually failed?
o Was it the inappropriate or insufficient use of existing instruments or
the inability of those instruments to deliver financial stability?

How should the objective of macro-prudential policy be defined? How
broad or narrow should it be?
o

XI.
Conclusion
As the stability of the financial system often has regional and global dimensions, the
multilateral aspects of macro-prudential policy will need to be fully considered, by
ensuring that frameworks in individual countries are mutually consistent, while taking
into account, country-specific circumstances. Whatever the mechanism, recent
experience has demonstrated that financial stability, and macro-prudential policy,
needs to be given higher priority than in the past.
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